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The Old Rules No Longer Apply:  
Explaining Narco-Assassinations of  
Mexican Politicians 
Laura Ross Blume 
Abstract: Between 2005 and 2015, organized criminal groups murdered 
209 politicians in Mexico. This paper explains why. It argues that the two 
interwoven trends of political and criminal pluralization in Mexico fos-
tered the conditions for a new type of criminal violence against politi-
cians. Mexican politicians are now targeted for accepting illicit money as 
well as for standing up to criminals. Moreover, this violence is evidence 
of an alarming and persistent pattern in Mexico of politicians enlisting 
criminal organizations to eliminate their political competition. Using a 
zero-inflated negative binomial model, this paper shows there is a strong 
statistical relationship between the increase in assassinations and the 
increases in political pluralization and criminal fragmentation. The article 
concludes that the failure to protect local public officials creates greater 
opportunities for the emergence of subnational authoritarian enclaves 
and threatens democratic consolidation. 
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1 Introduction 
When Servando Gómez Martínez was arrested on 27 February 2015, a 
former head of Mexican intelligence stated that the Caballeros Templari-
os (Knights Templar) kingpin had used the “‘law of lead or silver’ against 
Michoacán’s politicians” (The Economist 2015). The “law of lead or sil-
ver,” more commonly referred to in Spanish as plata o plomo, was coined 
by the infamous Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar to describe his 
approach to dealing with public officials. In essence, organized crime 
wields two main means of influencing the state: corruption and coercion. 
These two approaches seem mutually exclusive as politicians can either 
accept illicit money and cooperate or risk assassination. It has been ar-
gued that Mexico’s democratization and increased electoral competition 
have compounded the potential for illicit money in campaigns (Curzio 
2000, 2013; Velasco 2005; Morris 2009; Casas-Zamora 2010, 2013). Yet, 
if there is more money flowing from the cartels to the politicians, it 
seems surprising that an unprecedented number of them are being assas-
sinated – 209 between 2005 and 2015. Moreover, organized crime is not 
new to Mexico and existed peacefully for years under the hegemonic 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). What caused this shift to-
ward violence?  
This paper1 argues that the two interwoven trends of political plu-
ralization and criminal fragmentation in Mexico fostered the conditions 
for a new type of criminal violence against political figures. I argue that 
assassinations are far more likely in states with higher levels of criminal 
pluralization. This is because when criminal syndicates fragment, even 
cooperating politicians are at risk of getting caught in the midst of intra-
cartel battles or being targeted by a rival. At the same time, heightened 
electoral competition and rising support for opposition parties increases 
the chances of politicians being compelled to accept illicit money, which 
makes them more susceptible to attacks by fragmenting criminal organi-
zations. Increased political competition also guarantees that stable 
agreements between politicians and narcos, such as the ones that existed 
under PRI hegemony, are not possible. Finally, increased electoral com-
petition offers politicians with the incentive to employ more desperate 
                                                 
1  For their feedback on previous drafts, I would like to thank Taylor Boas, David 
Scott Palmer, Pilar Giannini, Erin Huebert, Karla León, and two anonymous 
reviewers, as well as the panelists and audience members from the 2015 panel 
“Mexican Politics” at the New England Council of Latin American Studies and 
the 2016 Junior Scholar Symposium “Corruption and Crime in Latin America” 
at the Midwest Political Science Association. 
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means to suppress their opponents. In this regard, the violence against 
politicians is also evidence of an alarming and persistent pattern of Mexi-
can politicians enlisting criminal organizations to carry out their dirty 
work.  
This paper begins by examining the historical context of state–
criminal dynamics in Mexico and reviewing the relevant literature on this 
topic. Next, I outline the methods and datasets used to empirically test 
my predictions. Then, I present results from an original dataset of Mexi-
can political figures murdered between 2005 and 2015 (N = 209). Com-
bining this data with two measures of criminal pluralization and data on 
the electoral success of opposition parties, I use a zero-inflated negative 
binomial model to test the relationship between criminal fragmentation 
and political pluralization, on the one hand, and the assassinations of 
politicians at the state level (N = 310), on the other hand. Confirming 
my theoretical expectations, I find strong statistical evidence that both 
criminal fragmentation and political pluralization increase the number of 
political assassinations. Building on Trejo and Ley’s (2016) theory about 
the importance of copartisanship and the targeting of leftist politicians 
by the Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), I find evidence that the leftist 
Partido Revoluationario Democratica (PRD) is being disproportionately 
targeted and that this trend has increased under the PRI administration 
of Enrique Peña Nieto. I show how the targeting of politicians from the 
PRD (which has a history of being the target of political assassinations) 
is merely one of several persistent patterns unfolding in Mexico (Schatz 
2006, 2008). Moreover, I find that criminal groups that emerged under 
PRI hegemony are less likely to assassinate politicians compared to their 
newer counterparts. I argue that the most likely explanation for this is 
both (i) the legacy of ties between these criminal organizations and the 
political elite and (ii) the fact that these cartels rose to prominence under 
the informally institutionalized “old rules of the game” that governed 
state–criminal interactions for decades. 
In discussing the empirical results, I use cases of recent assassina-
tions to highlight the three main reasons politicians are currently being 
killed: (1) accepting illicit money from a criminal organization and be-
coming a target for rivals and/or getting caught in the middle of intracar-
tel fighting; (2) refusing to cooperate with criminal organizations; (3) 
having a political opponent with narco-connections. I conclude by dis-
cussing the implications for democratization and the risks posed by the 
growing threat of subnational authoritarian narco-enclaves. 
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2 Background and Theory  
Nicknamed the “perfect dictatorship,” the PRI ruled Mexico for 71 
years. The party’s hegemonic control and longevity was largely attributa-
ble to its ability to mollify political opposition through incorporating key 
social groups (e.g., business, labor, and peasants) into the party’s struc-
ture (Magaloni 2008; Collier 1992). During the first phase of licit labor 
incorporation in Mexico, the United States was experimenting with pro-
hibition, which spurred the expansion of nascent illicit networks across 
the US–Mexico border. Leaving control of this bourgeoning criminal 
sector solely in the hands of local strongmen could have posed a threat 
to PRI hegemony, so the PRI incorporated the narcos just as they did 
legitimate business. It was not that narcos infiltrated the state institu-
tions; rather a system of top-down control over the criminal industry was 
established (Shirk and Wallman 2015; Flores Pérez 2009). 
In fact, the PRI’s centralized control over the illicit industry mir-
rored the party’s top-down control or “authoritarian corporatism” over 
legal business (Velasco 2005). This control allowed the PRI to get their 
cut of the illicit profits and it also enabled them to keep narcos from 
behaving in politically unpopular ways, which kept violence relatively low 
(Rios 2012; Osorio 2013; Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009). In ex-
change for compliance, narcos could purchase licenses from local offi-
cials enabling them to carry out their business (Lupsha 1991: 179). They 
also would report noncompliant criminal syndicates to authorities, mak-
ing arrests easy for law enforcement and concurrently eliminating their 
market competition (Lupsha 1991: 182). Given its symbiotic nature, this 
narco-corporatist arrangement would prove stable for decades (Lupsha 
1991: 182; Osorio 2013; Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009). 
In 1968 the PRI showed its first signs of weakness when it failed to 
use cooptation and resorted to brutally repressing student protests. The 
Tlatelolco massacre hurt the legitimacy of the PRI and was the beginning 
of a period of increased repression. Subsequently, the PRI increasingly 
targeted political dissidents and “in those days it was more dangerous to 
be a guerilla, or a political dissident than a drug trafficker” (Hernández 
2013: 64). Moreover, by some accounts, it seems that political repression 
and collusion with the narco-industry were inherently interwoven phe-
nomenon. For instance, Reuter and Ronfeldt (1992: 14) claim that  
the DFS [Dirección Federal de Seguridad] resorted to using local 
drug producers and traffickers as operatives, exchanging tolerance 
of their criminal activities for assistance with paramilitary opera-
tions. 
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Thus, starting in the 1970s, the narcos not only paid their dues to the 
party, they also became the party’s unofficial agents to suppress the op-
position.  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, numerous factors contributed to 
the demise of the narco-corporatist system. The first was the torture and 
murder of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Enrique “Kiki” 
Camarena by the Guadalajara cartel. In the aftermath of the Camarena 
affair, Mexico’s Federal Security Directorate (DFS) was dissolved. This 
was significant because since its formation in 1947, the DFS had been 
the main intermediary between the PRI party and the narcos (Osorio 
2013: 214; Lupsha 1991: 180; Astroga 2000: 79). Following the dissolu-
tion of the DFS, the PRI lost its main oversight and control mechanism 
for the illicit industry (Osorio 2013: 243). The fallout from the Camarena 
affair also started a revolving door between former state agents and 
criminal enterprises that contributed to the militarization of the criminal 
organizations (Osorio 2013: 242).  
In addition to growing more politically autonomous and beginning 
to acquire their own means of enforcement, the narcos were also seeing 
increased profits due to US crackdowns on Colombian traffickers and 
the rising demand for cocaine (Hyland 2011; Reuter and Ronfeldt 1992: 
2). Criminal profits continued to grow, getting another boost with the 
passage of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 
(Shelley 2001: 217). Yet, as profits increased, so did the competition. 
Another result of the Camarena affair was the arrests of Rafael Caro 
Quintero, Ernesto Fonseca Carillo, and Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo (“El 
Padrino”) and the subsequent breakup of the Guadalajara cartel. Where 
there had been two primary cartels (the Gulf and Guadalajara cartels), 
there were now four key organizations in the criminal world (the Gulf, 
Sinaloa, Tijuana, and Juarez cartels). 
At the same time, Mexico was undergoing a period of market liber-
alization. In 1982, in the wake of Mexico’s debt default, the country 
entered into a period of serious market and economic reform. There 
were extensive efforts to privatize state-owned enterprises, which saw 
the number of state-owned firms decrease from 1,155 to a mere 226 
between 1982 and 1993. However, these reforms had unintended conse-
quences, as families with fortunes made in the illicit sectors “were able to 
acquire formerly state-owned businesses, allowing them to mingle crimi-
nal money with the legitimate economy” (Shelley 2001: 218). In addition, 
links grew between the banking industry and traffickers (and still exist 
today), which were essential for facilitating money laundering (Hernán-
dez 2013: 111–112; Aristegui Noticias 2016). Overall, market liberalization 
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fostered an environment in which the rising financial elites interconnect-
ed with the narco-elites, who were simultaneously gaining increased 
power and autonomy. 
Meanwhile, the PRI was facing increased competition from opposi-
tion parties, especially at the lower levels of government. With rising 
electoral competition, there was more of a need for money – even illicit 
money – to pay for campaigns (Morris 2009; Casas-Zamora 2010; Casas-
Zamora 2013). This coincided with and furthered the fundamental shift 
in the norms of interaction between the state and criminal organizations 
that was taking place (Hernández 2013: 93). The shift was from the sys-
tem of political control to one characterized by significantly higher levels 
of drug-money in politics: “No more ‘paying taxes’: now you had to 
offer hefty bribes, enough to make the fortunes of politicians and busi-
nessmen overnight” (Hernández 2013: 93). As the cartels gained auton-
omy and capitalized on the new liberalized economic policies, the politi-
cal–criminal dynamic in Mexico began to resemble a form of marketized 
corruption. 
Concurrently, there was also a greater need to appear to be working 
against cartels as democratization drew more attention to corruption 
(Morris 2009). As its power declined, the PRI resorted to more desperate 
means of maintaining control. Schatz (2006, 2008) documents the party’s 
campaign of political assassinations against the leftist PRD, murders that 
were often carried out with hired guns. Although the PRI lost its mo-
nopoly on power at the state level (starting with the governorship in Baja 
California in 1989 and ending with the presidency in 2000, which was 
won by Vicente Fox of the Partido de Acción Nacional [PAN]), the PRI 
remained the only game in town in many municipalities. Thus, the PRI 
was able to maintain subnational enclaves of autocratic control within 
the context of federal democracy (Gibson 2010, 2013).  
In sum, the PRI incorporated the narco-industry the same way it in-
corporated legal business. Narco-corporatism allowed the illicit sector to 
grow with low levels of violence. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
dynamics of state–criminal interaction shifted toward a more individual-
istic pattern of marketized corruption, paralleling the broader political 
and economic shifts that were occurring in the country. This shift to 
marketized corruption is a necessary antecedent factor in the explanation 
of why criminals are now targeting politicians. Lastly, the symbiotic na-
ture of the relationship between the PRI and the narcos under narco-
corporatism also established a historical precedent for criminal syndi-
cates being hired to target the political opposition – a pattern that is 
unfortunately continuing today.  
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This paper builds upon the existing theories of why narco-related 
violence dramatically increased in Mexico during the middle of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. Democratization and decentralization 
in Mexico resulted in the deterioration of government-sponsored protec-
tion rackets (Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009), generated new coordina-
tion problems between layers of government (Rios 2015; Duran-Mar-
tinez 2015; Shirk and Wallman 2015), and ultimately led to the collapse 
of the former political order (Rios 2012, 2015; Osorio 2013). My argu-
ment about the implications of political pluralization complements these 
theories of violence in Mexico and extends them to a specific form of 
narco-violence, the targeting of elected officials.  
Narco-assassinations of politicians are arguably the most direct way 
that criminal organizations can undermine democratic processes; they 
have blatant consequences for democratic governance. Schedler (2014) 
discusses the threat posed by “candidate cleansing” in his examination of 
the impact criminal violence has on Mexico’s democracy. However, there 
has been relatively limited scholarly attention to the recent increase in 
narco-related assassinations of Mexican politicians. Rios (2011) looks at 
29 cases of mayoral assassination and claims that the practice of plata o 
plomo does not apply to the Mexican case. She argues that decentraliza-
tion has made municipal politicians relevant to traffickers and thus put 
them at risk of being “punished” despite the fact that mayors are still 
unable to actually control enforcement, which can be sent from higher 
levels (Rios 2011). In addition to the impacts of decentralization, Rios 
(2011) notes that the cartels’ expansion into the domestic drug market 
has made local politicians all the more valuable to the cartels. In contrast, 
I do not find evidence for the idea that larger local drug markets increase 
the rate at which politicians are targeted. 
Trejo and Ley (2015) look at politicians who were threatened, kid-
napped, attacked, and killed between 1995 and 2014. They contend that 
there are three main factors that make politicians likelier targets: they 
come from (i) municipalities that have higher levels of intracartel vio-
lence associated with controlling trafficking routes, (ii) municipalities that 
have more fiscal autonomy and increased tax revenue, or (iii) leftist op-
position–led municipalities where the central government does not offer 
protection to officials who have been threatened by organized crime 
(Trejo and Ley 2015). Expanding on this, Trejo and Ley (2016) challenge 
the dominant narrative that coordination problems contributed to in-
creased narco-violence in Mexico under President Calderón (Duran-
Martinez 2015; Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009; Osorio 2013; Rios 
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2012; Rios 2015). They explore the relationship between copartisans and 
levels of violence and argue that,  
Mexican national authorities developed coordinated interventions 
in subnational regions under the control of the president’s con-
servative party but adopted confrontational strategies in states 
ruled by leftist subnational authorities, who belonged to the party 
that persistently denied the president’s legitimacy as an elected au-
thority. (Trejo and Ley 2016: 12) 
This suggests that the contested 2006 presidential elections renewed the 
systematic targeting of PRD politicians, which Schatz (2006, 2008) notes 
has a long history in Mexico. 
I find evidence for Ley and Trejo’s theory about copartisanship, but 
this does not mean that merely restoring one-party control or consisten-
cy in politicians’ party affiliations at various levels would reduce violence 
and reestablish the prior order (Shirk and Wallman 2015). The parties 
have taken different policy stances toward organized crime; therefore, 
consistent control by the PAN may have very different implications than 
those produced by consistent control by the PRI. Dell (2015) shows that 
violence increases in municipalities following close victories by PAN 
candidates. Her explanation for this phenomenon is that PAN coordina-
tion increases the probability of government enforcement in those areas, 
thus weakening incumbent cartels and inviting rival competition.  
This paper seeks to build on these previous works by utilizing new 
data and methods to further academic understanding of the motivations 
behind the assassinations of politicians in Mexico. While Rios focused 
solely on the assassinations of mayors (Rios 2011), it seemed appropriate 
to extend that scope and include officials at all levels of government, 
ranging from local council members to national party leaders. Unlike 
some studies (Guerrero-Gutiérrez 2011: 45), my dataset excludes offi-
cials who were part of law enforcement. The reasoning for this is simple: 
cartels have a more obvious reason to target law enforcement officials 
who are working (or at least supposed to be working) in direct conflict 
with the cartels’ objectives. As a result, it is argued that the murder of a 
police chief has different motivations and implications than the murder 
of a mayor, councilmember, or campaign manager. Lastly, I chose to 
limit my data to the most extreme form of narco-violence: assassination. 
This decision was made based on the feasibility of obtaining reliable data, 
as threats and attacks are far more subject to underreporting.  
Theoretically building on Rios’ work on why cartels “punish” politi-
cians, I argue that one motivation for cartels is a result of criminal plural-
ization: new cartels move into a territory, or an old alliance fractures, and 
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the politician is caught in the middle of the resulting narco-conflict. This 
explains why corruption and coercion cannot be seen as mutually exclu-
sive tactics in Mexico. In fact, they are self-reinforcing, and political 
pluralization only increases the risk of narco-money in politics (Casas-
Zamora 2013). As Morris states, when the stakes are higher and the 
competition greater, there is also “the greater likelihood of employing 
illegal campaign contributions” (Morris 2009: 29). While Mexico has 
taken efforts to tighten campaign finance regulations, these efforts have 
been limited to national politics. Furthermore, there is enormous region-
al disparity in terms of compliance with election finance rules (Curzio 
2013: 158), while criminal organizations have been able to achieve signif-
icant influence at the local level (Manaut 2013: 156). Yet, this motivation 
for criminals to assassinate politicians only explains those who are inten-
tionally or accidently complicit with the cartels. As Trejo and Ley (2015: 
2) point out, “Sería un error, también, olvidar a los alcaldes y candidatos 
asesinados por negarse a servir al crimen organizado” (It would be a 
mistake, too, to forget the mayors and candidates killed for refusing to 
serve organized crime). Thus, failing to comply with cartels or taking a 
strong stance against them is the second key motivation for cartels killing 
politicians.  
Both of these motivations (cooperating with criminals and refusing 
to cooperate) are “new” in the sense that before the shift from narco-
corporatism to marketized corruption, neither would have occurred. 
However, the third motivation I highlight (politicians using criminal 
groups to kill opponents) has a historical legacy. A theme in the literature 
on Latin American politics is persistent patterns. Democratization in-
creased cartels’ opportunities to become involved in politics and generat-
ed “new” forms of corruption while simultaneously allowing old forms 
of corruption to persist (Morris 2009; Velasco 2005). Similarly, political 
pluralization and criminal fragmentation have generated new forms of 
violence against politicians, while old forms also have endured and rein-
vented themselves. 
3 Data and Methods 
To test the relationship between pluralization and the assassination of 
politicians, I first collated a dataset on all assassinations of political fig-
ures in Mexico between 2005 and 2015. The dataset collated names, 
dates, current and/or former political positions, locations, party affilia-
tions, and brief synopses of the attacks. If the politician was “disap-
peared” and the body was not found, the case was only included in the 
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dataset if the politician was widely presumed dead, had been missing for 
over a year, and was reported to have been kidnapped (i.e., there was no 
chance he merely ran off). To verify that the list was comprehensive, 
several Mexican and international news sources were monitored on a 
regular basis, and numerous LexisNexis and Google queries were run in 
both English and Spanish. Next, I utilized this data to construct a panel 
dataset where the unit of analysis is state-years. This dataset includes the 
number of assassinations, measures of political and criminal pluraliza-
tion, and numerous control variables. This dataset contains data from the 
period 2005–2015 and includes all states except for the Federal District 
(N = 341).  
Political pluralization is operationalized as the share of votes for 
opposition parties in the most recent municipal elections – that is, the 
percent of the vote lost by the incumbent governor’s party. For example, 
if the state has a PRI governor and in the last municipal elections the 
PRI won 40 percent of the vote, then the political pluralization score 
would be 60 percent. This operationalization is based on the theoretical 
expectation that differences in party affiliation generate coordination 
problems across the layers of government, undermining pacts between 
politicians and criminals. It is also based on the idea that rising electoral 
competition generates incentives to accept narco-money or even to use 
narcos to target one’s opponents. Given that the majority of the violence 
is concentrated at the lower levels of government (municipal and state), 
it was assumed that growing fragmentation mattered the most at these 
levels as opposed to disconnects between federal and state or federal and 
local governments. Finally, the measure of political pluralization is lagged 
because of theoretical expectations about the direction of causality, due 
to the fact that Mexican states hold elections at different times of the 
year, and to avoid the risk of endogeneity. Due to this being a lagged 
variable, N is reduced to 310 in all the statistical models. 
This paper uses two measures of criminal fragmentation: the total 
number of cartels operating in a state (“TotalCartels”) and a dummy 
variable indicating the removal of prominent cartel leaders due to arrest, 
extradition, or death (“Kingpin”). These two variables were coded using 
data from Animal Político’s new resource NarcoData and information 
from Insight Crime reports. Prior research has demonstrated that the 
removal of a criminal syndicate’s leader increases violence because it 
becomes more susceptible to intracartel leadership battles and splinter-
ing, on the one hand, and attacks from rivals hoping to exploit their 
moment of weakness, on the other (Dickenson 2014; Philips 2015; Cal-
derón et al. 2015). The total number of criminal organizations is also 
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important since the more groups there are, the more competitive the 
criminal environment will be, and the greater the risk of violence will be. 
Due to allegations of collusion between the PAN and Sinaloa cartel 
(Hernández 2013; Shelley 2001), I controlled for states where the Sinaloa 
cartel operates and where the PAN controlled the governorship or the 
majority of the municipal governments to see if there were lower num-
bers of assassinations in these states. In addition, I controlled for the 
homicide rate (y), the per capita rate of state income from taxes 
(INEGI), whether there were elections at the state or local level, whether 
there was a federal level crackdown on organized crime in the state (Nar-
coData), the total number of agents per capita from the Ministerio Pú-
blico, and – to measure states’ internal drug markets – arrests for posses-
sion of narcotics (PGR 2015). I also controlled for the number of mu-
nicipalities in a state, since states with more municipalities simply have 
more politicians who could potentially be targets. In addition, all models 
included year fixed effects and standard errors were clustered by state. 
Finally, to explore the impacts of having begun operations under the old 
rules of narco-corporatism, I test for differences between the cartels that 
emerged prior to the early 1990s and those that emerged in recent years. 
For all the models, the outcome of interest is the number of assas-
sinations in a state during a given year. As the summary statistics in table 
1 show, the variance and standard deviation of the number of assassina-
tions is greater than the mean. This suggests a Poisson model would not 
be a good choice. However, negative binomial models are appropriate 
for count variables with overdispersion. Zero-inflated models are often 
appropriate when there are excessive zeros. Out of 341 state-year pairs, 
240 are zeros. That means 70.38 percent of the total dataset is a none-
vent outcome. More important than the number of zeros in the data is 
the fact that the assumptions about the data-generating process are 
slightly different for the two models. While the standard negative bino-
mial model assumes that all units of observation have the potential for a 
positive count outcome, this may be a specious assumption. In some 
cases the number of assassinations is almost certain to be zero. In es-
sence, there are two processes happening: a first process that distin-
guishes between certain zeros and potential events and a second process 
that calculates the expected number of assassinations in each of the re-
maining state-years. The zero-inflated model reflects this process since it 
actually comprises a logit model to determine certain zeros and a nega-
tive binomial model to estimate the counts. Here the independent varia-
bles for the logit model are the total number of cartels in the state, a 
dummy for whether the governor and president are from the same party, 
  70 Laura Ross Blume 
 
and another dummy for whether the majority of the municipal govern-
ments are of the same party as the governor. The total number of cartels 
is included since if there are no cartels operating in the state, there 
should not be any politician–narco interaction; thus, these cases would 
almost certainly be zero outcomes. The two aforementioned dummy 
variables are based on Trejo and Ley’s (2015, 2016) findings regarding 
the importance of copartisanship.  
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
Assassinations 0.595 1.227 0 7 
Political Pluralization 
(lagged by 1 year) 0.602 0.099 0.401 0.8658 
Total Cartels 1.727 1.222 0 5 
Kingpin Removal 0.563 0.497 0 1 
PAN–Sinaloa 0.120 0.326 0 1 
Drug Market (per capita) 28.487 51.508 0.13 333.71 
Homicide Rate per 
100,000 16.102 18.762 1.72 181.75 
Crackdown 0.062 0.241 0 1 
State Revenue (per capita) 0.314 0.268 0.02 1.58 
Agents (per capita) 9.519 5.905 1.73 45.12 
Municipalities 78.645 104.846 5 570 
 
For robustness checks, I ran a zero-inflated Poisson as well as a standard 
negative binomial model and standard Poisson model (results from these 
last two models are included in the appendix). I used the likelihood ratio 
test of alpha equals zero to see if the negative binomial model was supe-
rior to the Poisson distribution and found it was (p = 0.009). I then used 
the Vuong test to see if the zero-inflated negative binomial model was a 
statistically significantly better fit than the standard binomial model and 
found that it was (p = 0.033). However, with the zero-inflated models, it 
seems the negative binomial model is not necessarily better than the 
zero-inflated Poisson model given that the likelihood ratio test of alpha 
equals zero was not statistically significant (p = 0.11). That said, due to 
the overdispersion in the data, I maintain that the negative binomial 
model offers the best approximation. Figure 4 (appendix) demonstrates 
that the zero-inflated Poisson model is more likely to underpredict zero 
counts and overpredict counts of one compared to the zero-inflated 
negative binomial model. 
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4 Results 
Between 2005 and 2015 in Mexico, 209 political figures were assassinat-
ed. In both 2005 and 2006, 2 politicians were murdered; by 2010, this 
number had jumped to 30.  
Figure 1. Assassinations by Year, 2005–2015 
 
Source:  Author. 
In 83 percent of the cases the victims were municipal-level politicians. 
Of the total politicians assassinated, 88 were members of the PRI, 39 
were members of the PAN, 49 were members of the PRD, 19 were 
members of other parties, and 14 did not report any party affiliation (6 
percent). However, these numbers are fairly misleading since they do not 
account for the parties’ relative strengths at the municipal level. Despite 
the democratic opening at the national level, at the municipal level the 
PRI is still the dominant party; therefore, there are simply more PRI 
politicians to potentially be killed. Therefore, controlling for municipal-
level party strength is important when exploring different patterns of 
targeting politicians based on their partisan affiliation. As illustrated in 
figure 2, when accounting for the share of municipalities under various 
parties’ control, a different picture emerges. 
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Figure 2. Assassinations by Partisanship Compared to Party Strength 
 
Source:  Author. 
Although past literature emphasizes the Calderón administration’s target-
ing of opposition politicians (Trejo and Ley 2015, 2016), I find that co-
partisanship has become even more significant in determining who is 
assassinated under the current administration of President Enrique Peña 
Nieto (PRI). Under Peña Nieto, the assassination rates of PRD politi-
cians in municipalities under PRI control have increased from 1.48 to 
2.14; of PAN politicians (now in the opposition), from 0.66 to 1.15. In 
contrast, the targeting of PRI politicians has decreased by 0.38 and the 
targeting of other parties has also decreased by 0.21.  
The disproportionate targeting of PRD members for political rea-
sons has historical roots (Schatz 2006, 2008). Nevertheless, even if the 
PRD appear to be disproportionately targeted due to political motiva-
tions, this does not mean that narcos are not the ones carrying out the 
murders. The descriptions of nearly all of the murders followed certain 
patterns that are characteristic of organized crime. Thus, if the motiva-
tion is political, the executioners still appear to be criminals, likely hired 
guns for corrupt politicians.  
The disproportionate targeting of the PRD also helps explain the 
geography of where the most politicians are murdered. As figure 3 
demonstrates, the states with the highest number of murders are Micho-
acán and Guerrero. The southern part of Mexico has always been a re-
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gion with higher levels of support for the leftist party. Moreover, there 
are clear socioeconomic divides between regions of Mexico, with Guer-
rero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas being the poorest states and neighboring 
Michoacán and Puebla also falling below the national average. Besides 
sociodemographic and partisan differences, Michoacán and Guerrero 
have some of the highest levels of criminal pluralization. Michoacán is 
where the Zetas first began establishing their autonomy from the Gulf 
cartel after La Familia Michoacana (LFM) publically declared war on the 
Zetas by infamously rolling decapitated heads onto the floor of a night-
club in Uruapan (Grayson 2010). In addition, Michoacán was the state 
where the autodefensas (self-defense groups, commonly considered to be 
vigilantes) emerged. At least one of the assassinated politicians was 
known to have ties to autodefensas.  
Figure 3. Geographical Distribution of Assassinations, 2005–2015 
 
Source:  Author. 
The importance of both criminal fragmentation and political pluraliza-
tion are confirmed by the statistical analysis. Table 2 presents results 
from both the zero-inflated negative binomial and Poisson models. (The 
results from the standard negative binomial and Poisson model specifica-
tions are presented in table 4 in the appendix, as are the predictive mar-
gins with confidence intervals for the three main variables of interest in 
figures 5, 6, and 7.)  
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Table 2. Model Results 
DV = Assassinations Zero-Inflated 
Negative Binomial 
Zero-Inflated 
Poisson 
Political Pluralization  2.122** 2.051** 
  (0.716) (0.699) 
Total Cartels 0.278* 0.262* 
 (0.108) (0.108) 
Kingpin 0.727** 0.753** 
  (0.247) (0.242) 
PAN–Sinaloa  -1.408*** -1.416*** 
 (0.361) (0.361) 
Drug Market  0.0038 0.004 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Homicide Rate  0.0159*** 0.0150*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0032) 
Crackdown  0.361 0.334 
 (0.277) (0.275) 
State Income  -1.086* -1.169* 
 (0.501) (0.518) 
Agents  -0.0326 -0.0314* 
  (0.0176) (0.0173) 
Municipalities  0.00305*** 0.00297*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Total Cartels (inflated)  -2.042** -1.980** 
 (0.717) (0.668) 
Same Party (inflated)  4.135* 3.854* 
 (1.768) (1.594) 
Observations (N) 310 310 
Cragg–Uhler (Nagelkerke) R2  0.465 0.501 
ML (Cox–Snell) R2  0.411 0.446 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
The results show that there are positive and statistically significant rela-
tionships between the number of assassinated politicians and both politi-
cal pluralization and criminal fragmentation. These results were con-
sistent regardless of model specification (see appendix), and both 
measures of criminal fragmentation (i.e., the total number of cartels and 
the removal of a kingpin) were positive and statistically significant pre-
dictors of assassinations. In terms of the magnitude of these results, 
increasing the opposition parties’ electoral support from 0 percent to 100 
percent (holding everything else constant) would lead to an expected 
8.35 increase in the assassination rate. Looking at the average marginal 
effects, increasing the share of votes for opposition parties (parties other 
than the current governor’s party) from 50 percent to 80 percent increas-
es the expected number of assassinations from 0.486 to 1.082. A one-
unit increase in the number of criminal organizations present in a state 
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results in an expected increase of 1.320 in the assassination rate, all else 
being equal. The average marginal effects suggest that increasing the 
number of criminal syndicates from 2 to 5 increases the expected num-
ber of assassinations from 0.710 to 1.252. The removal of a kingpin is 
expected to increase the number of assassinations by a rate of 2.068.  
Additionally, the results offer evidence of a statistically significant 
and negative relationship between the number of assassinations and 
states with a PAN governor and where the Sinaloa cartel operates. The 
combined presence of the Sinaloa cartel with a PAN governor, all else 
being equal, decreased the assassination rate by 0.2446. This finding 
supports allegations that the PAN systematically protected the Sinaloa 
cartel while targeting their rivals (Hernández 2013). Hernández sees this 
as a symbiotic arrangement stemming from an alleged campaign dona-
tion paid by Sinaloa affiliates to support PAN presidential candidate 
Vicente Fox. An alternative and less controversial explanation is that 
organizations that focused primarily or exclusively on trafficking were 
not the main targets of the government-led crackdown (Jones 2016). 
Unsurprisingly, both the homicide rate and the number of municipalities 
were statistically significant and positively related to the number of assas-
sinations, meaning that the greater the number of politicians in a state 
(more potential targets) and the more violent the state, the more likely it 
is that a politician will be assassinated.  
Lastly, to test the impact of evolving under the narco-corporatism 
system compared to the new system of individualistic marketized corrup-
tion, I examined whether criminal syndicates that emerged prior to 1995 
were more or less likely to assassinate politicians compared to organiza-
tions that have emerged in recent years. I coded the following cartels as 
having emerged under the old rules: Gulf, Sinaloa, Milenio, Oaxaca, 
Tijuana, Juarez, and the Beltrán Leyva Organization.2 Cartels emerging 
under the new rules include the following: the Zetas, Cártel Jalisco Nue-
va Generación (CJNG), La Familia Michoacana (LFM), and the Caballe-
ros Templarios. Both variables are dummy variables that indicate wheth-
er or not any of these cartels were present in a state in a given year.  
                                                 
2  According to NarcoData, the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO) began in 
2008. However, I coded the BLO as being part of the older generation of crim-
inal syndicates since it was part of either the Sinaloa or Guadalajara cartels prior 
to 2008 and thus developed under the old rules. See the BLO profile, InSight 
Crime, online: <www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/beltran-
leyva-mexico>. 
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Table 3.  Impact of Whether Criminals Emerged under New Rules versus 
Old Rules 
DV = Assassinations Old Rules New Rules 
Criminal Organizations -0.533† 0.754*** 
 (0.297) (0.226) 
Political Pluralization  1.661* 1.514* 
  (0.754) (0.685) 
Total Cartels 0.376*** 0.232* 
 (0.107) (0.109) 
Kingpin 0.828** 0.752** 
  (0.247) (0.239) 
PAN–Sinaloa  -1.326*** -0.931* 
 (0.367) (0.401) 
Drug Market  0.0033 0.00474 
 (0.0029) (0.00270) 
Homicide Rate  0.0151*** 0.0188*** 
 (0.0036) (0.00384) 
Crackdown  0.351 0.119 
 (0.302) (0.290) 
State Income  -1.007* -1.200* 
 (0.509) (0.528) 
Agents  -0.0239 -0.0182 
  (0.0199) (0.0176) 
Municipalities  0.00346*** 0.00392*** 
  (0.000676) (0.000731) 
Total Cartels (inflated)  -2.177** -1.739** 
 (0.761) (0.654) 
Same Party (inflated)  3.788* 5.898 
 (1.543) (11.67) 
Observations (N) 310 310 
Cragg–Uhler (Nagelkerke) R2  0.474 0.488 
ML (Cox–Snell) R2  0.419 0.431 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses; † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Table 3 presents the results from the zero-inflated negative binomial 
regression models, comparing the impacts of newer criminal organiza-
tions versus those of older organizations. The results confirm my theo-
retical expectation that organizations arising under narco-corporatism are 
less likely to assassinate politicians than their newer counterparts. The 
incidence rate ratio shows that, all else being equal, the presence of one 
of the older criminal groups led to a reduction in the estimated assassina-
tions rate by 0.587, whereas the presence of newer criminal groups in-
creased the expected assassination rate by 2.126. However, it is im-
portant not to overstate these findings. First, the p-value for the old 
criminal organizations dummy variable was not significant at the usual 
level (p = 0.072). Second, these models looked at the relationship be-
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tween where various groups operate and where politicians are killed at 
the state level. Directly testing which groups kill more politicians would 
require evidence of which illegal organizations were behind each of the 
assassinations. Nonetheless, the results offer preliminary support that 
newer organizations are more likely to engage in violence than are their 
older rivals, which have deeper historical legacies of cooperation with the 
state.  
5 Discussion 
Desmond Arias (2010: 245) claims that “understanding politics in [Latin 
America] means understanding the multiple violent actors who persis-
tently operate in many countries and how they affect political out-
comes.” Narcos are having a significant impact on politics in Mexico. 
While numerous studies have looked at the impacts that rising criminal 
violence will have on democratization (Bailey 2014; Trelles and Carreras 
2012; Schedler 2014; Malone 2013; Bateson 2012; Velasco 2005), this 
paper has focused on a very specific kind of narco-violence: political 
assassinations. Narco-assassinations of elected officials arguably have the 
most direct impact on democratic governance. Complementing previous 
research on why criminal organizations in Mexico have become so vio-
lent, my empirical results show that there is a robust, statistically signifi-
cant relationship between criminal fragmentation and political pluraliza-
tion, on the one hand, and the number of politicians who are assassinat-
ed, on the other hand. I contend that this is because both of these fac-
tors increase the chances of politicians finding themselves in one of the 
three situations that is likely to motivate criminal organizations to target 
them. 
The first motivation for a criminal syndicate to murder a politician 
is related to the fragmentation of criminal syndicates and “new forms” of 
corruption. Politicians who accept illicit money or enter into agreements 
with criminal actors risk assassination from rival groups or fragments of 
the same group should the organization splinter due to internal fighting 
or leadership decapitation. In 2011 Fortino Cortés Sandoval, the PRI 
mayor of Zacatecas, was kidnapped and killed by the Zetas, who covered 
his body with a message accusing him of being an informant for the Gulf 
cartel (CNN 2011). Until the middle of the first decade of the twenty-
first century, the Zetas were merely the enforcement arm of the Gulf 
cartel. Officials may also be targeted by new criminal organizations for 
colluding with rival cartels. For instance, the order to assassinate the 
state minister of tourism, José de Jesús Gallegos Álvarez, allegedly came 
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from the head of the CJNG, because the minister was supposedly laun-
dering money for the CJNG’s rival, the Caballeros Templarios (Milenio 
2014). As the state minister of tourism, Gallegos Álvarez would have 
been in close contact with many high-end real estate and development 
people – a favorite industry for money laundering (Houston Chronicle 
2013). So while political pluralization and increased electoral competition 
has increased the risk of drug money in politics, criminal pluralization 
has increased the chances of corrupt politicians becoming targets of 
assassination.  
The second main motivation is that increased electoral competition 
and support for opposition parties produces a need for accountability 
and, as a result, increased political attention to corruption (Morris 2009). 
Many politicians with an honest desire to improve their communities 
have taken stances against the cartels and consequently become targets. 
Ygnacio Lopez Mendoza, a Michoacán mayor who was murdered in 
2013, famously went on a hunger strike in Mexico City to get more fund-
ing for his district. He publically spoke out against the extortion pressure 
he was facing from the Caballeros Templarios cartel. Lopez Mendoza 
refused to meet the criminals’ demands and was later found dead on the 
side of a road (Sanders and Zapata 2013; Sydney Morning Herald 2013; 
BBC 2013; Fausset and Sanchez 2013). Edelmiro Cavazos Leal, a PAN 
mayor from Nuevo León, similarly advocated a crackdown on corrup-
tion and organized crime; he was later abducted by 15 men and found 
murdered (BBC 2010).  
The third motivation is a reemergence of an old pattern of corrup-
tion and violence: state actors using criminal syndicates to carry out their 
dirty work and even eliminate political opponents. Although the PRD 
remains disproportionately targeted, under the more individualistic dy-
namic of marketized corruption, politically motivated assassinations span 
across party lines. In 2011 Régulo Cabrera Andrés, a PRI party leader 
from Guerrero, was shot in front of his wife and two children. His wife 
has accused the PRD of being responsible for the murder. José Consuelo 
González Xingú, a local official in Mexico state with no explicit partisan 
affiliation, was murdered in front of his house in 2010. Just before his 
assassination, he filed a complaint with the State Commission on Human 
Rights about intimidation, abuse of authority, and death threats from 
local police. His family and neighbors say the mayor was responsible; the 
mayor obviously denies these allegations (Dávila 2010). Nevertheless, the 
fact that Consuelo González had filed a complaint about death threats 
from the local police points to the pattern that gained attention in Iguala 
– one where corrupt politicians collude with criminal gangs and local law 
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enforcement to form a sort of local authoritarian enclave of narco-
politics. In such a setting, if their control is challenged by rising competi-
tion, they are all the more likely to react with repressive violence toward 
their opponents. 
As Schedler (2014: 14) notes, “we will never know how many [Mex-
ican politicians] have been dissuaded from ever running in the first place 
due to diffuse or specific threats of criminal violence.” However, given 
the horrific and tragic details of many politicians’ stories, it is safe to 
assume a lot of otherwise highly qualified candidates have decided and 
will decide against running for political office. Cases like that of Ignacio 
Domínguez Carranza, a former PAN mayoral candidate from Morelos, 
who was killed at his home along with his wife and 3-year-old child, 
highlight that the costs to politicians are rarely limited to just themselves. 
The case of María Santos Gorrostieta Salazar, a young mayor from Mi-
choacán, garnered international media attention after she published pho-
tos revealing scars and a colostomy bag following two assassination at-
tempts against her, one of which claimed the life of her husband. The 
narcos succeeded in their third attempt to kill Santos Gorrostieta when 
they ambushed her as she was taking her daughter to school. Pleading 
for her child to be left unharmed, she got into the vehicle of her attack-
ers and her body was found days later with signs of torture. These stories 
leave observers questioning why anyone not co-opted by the cartels 
would want to run for office in certain municipalities. Even when valiant 
and sincere politicians do run, it seems that in some areas their chances 
of being victorious or surviving in office are low.  
This raises the risk that more corrupt politicians will take their 
place. Once in office, corrupt politicians can use their criminal ties to 
squash any opposition and maintain their power. If criminals target the 
political opponent of a criminally affiliated politician and frame the at-
tack as an act of narco-violence rather than political assassination, it is a 
win-win strategy for both parties involved: the criminals not only ensure 
their preferred official remains in power but also enhance their reputa-
tion for violence, while the politician secures his or her post. Many car-
tels actively cultivate a brand of violence to gain respect in the criminal 
sphere and to scare others into obedience (Williams 2009). Thus, politi-
cians with narco-connections can obtain their own miniature political 
paramilitary groups, which even serve as a scapegoat for the violence. In 
situations where these same politicians control the local police and judi-
ciary, there is an iron triangle of corruption and criminal impunity that 
has devastating consequences for democratic governance and citizen 
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security. These are referred to as “subnational enclaves of narco-
politics.”  
Parallel processes of political pluralization and criminal fragmenta-
tion have resulted in an unprecedented number of politicians being mur-
dered in Mexico today. The proliferation of narco-politics at the subna-
tional level is directly connected to the increased assassination rate of 
politicians and is the result of the breakdown of the old rules that existed 
between the hegemonic PRI and Mexican criminal organizations. The 
concept of undemocratic subnational enclaves within Mexico is certainly 
not new (Faughnan, Hiskey, and Revey 2014; Giraudy 2010; Gibson 
2010, 2013). However, what this article’s exploration of narco-assassina-
tions in Mexico has highlighted is that not only are many of these en-
claves now authoritarian and undemocratic, they have also become ha-
vens of narco-politics. As was highlighted by José Luis Abarca, the for-
mer mayor of Iguala, narco-affiliated politicians in control of local forces 
and with ties to gangs can wreak incomprehensible damage on their 
communities. While the disappearance of the 43 students in Iguala gar-
nered international media attention in September 2014, the students were 
not the only victims: around 130 bodies were found in and around Iguala 
during the 18 months afterward (Grillo 2016). Unless the Mexican gov-
ernment takes action to ensure the physical safety of elected officials, it is 
very likely that more municipalities will become narco-authoritarian en-
claves and Mexico will risk undermining its new democracy from the 
bottom up.  
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Las Viejas Reglas Ya No Se Aplican: Explicando los Narco-
Asesinatos de los Políticos Mexicanos  
Resumen: Entre el 2005 y 2015, el crimen organizado asesinó a 209 
políticos Mexicanos. Este artículo argumenta que el entrelace entre las 
tendencias de pluralización política y criminal crearon las condiciones 
para la emergencia de un nuevo tipo de violencia política en México. 
Actualmente, los políticos mexicanos corren riesgo tanto por aceptar 
dinero ilícito, como por afrontar el crimen organizado. Esto refleja un 
patrón alarmante y persistente en México donde los políticos corruptos 
usan el crimen organizado para ejecutar sus actividades ilícitas y para 
eliminar su competencia política. Utilizando un modelo binomial cero-
inflado negativo, se muestra la correlación entre el aumento del numero 
de asesinatos y la magnitud de pluralización política y fragmentación 
criminal. En conclusión, carencias en la protección de funcionarios pú-
blicos locales han generado oportunidades para el surgimiento de encla-
ves autoritarios subnacionales, que últimamente debilitan la consolida-
ción democrática. 
Palabras clave: México, violencia, crimen organizado, corrupción, de-
mocratización 
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Appendix 
Table 4. Results from Standard Negative Binomial and Poisson Models 
DV = Assas-
sinations 
Negative 
Binomial 
Poisson ZINB ZIP
Political Plural-
ization  2.083* 1.932** 2.122** 2.051** 
  (0.836) (0.740) (0.716) (0.699)
Total Cartels 0.430*** 0.413*** 0.278* 0.262*
 (0.115) (0.104) (0.108) (0.108)
Kingpin 0.745* 0.812** 0.727** 0.753**
  (0.294) (0.268) (0.247) (0.242)
PAN–Sinaloa  -1.392*** -1.375*** -1.408** -1.416***
 (0.357) (0.362) (0.361) (0.361)
Drug Market  0.00292 0.00287 0.0038 0.004
 (0.00294) (0.00304) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Homicide Rate  0.0159*** 0.0141*** 0.0159*** 0.0150***
 (0.00478) (0.00336) (0.0036) (0.0032)
Crackdown 0.407 0.361 0.361 0.334
 (0.296) (0.312) (0.277) (0.275)
State Income  -0.822 -0.936 -1.086* -1.169*
 (0.542) (0.543) (0.501) (0.518)
Agents  -0.0272 -0.0236 -0.0326 -0.0314*
  (0.0222) (0.0206) (0.0176) (0.0173)
Municipalities  0.00403*** 0.00403*** 0.00305*** 0.00297***
  (0.000913) (0.000876) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Observations 
(N) 310 310 310 310 
Cragg–Uhler 
(Nagelkerke) R2  0.437 0.632 0.465 0.501 
ML (Cox–
Snell) R2  0.386 0.583 0.411 0.446 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Figure 4. Comparing the Fit of Various Count Models3  
 
Figure 5. Criminal Pluralization (Total Cartels), Predictive Margins with 95 
Percent CIs  
 
                                                 
3  Sources Figure 4 to Figure7: Author. 
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Figure 6. Criminal Pluralization (Kingpin), Predictive Margins with 95 Per-
cent CIs  
 
Figure 7. Political Pluralization, Predictive Margins with 95 Percent CIs 
 
